SOCIALIST UNITY

interview with student leader Manushi Bhattarai

Manushi Bhattarai is part of the Maoist ticket that swept the student elections at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu - Nepal’s largest university. Here she discusses the revolution, recent political developments, the international situation and the role of young people with Ben Peterson.

Peterson: Thanks a lot for meeting with me. The All Nepal National Independent Student Union (Revolutionary) won the student elections at Tribhuvan University. What did the campaign involve, and what are some of your policies as a revolutionary student union?

Bhattarai: The student union elections were a very historically important process for our organisation and for the Maoist party. There have been student elections for many years, but for some time the revolutionary student movement has not been able, or allowed to participate. We were banned. Also we did not look at these elections simply from the point of view as elections to the student representative bodies but as part of the whole ongoing political process in Nepal.

So in those terms, we had a real breakthrough. We were not contesting for the offices as such, but linking the student struggles to the political process. While we were campaigning we always had this in mind. We campaigned around the issues on this campaign, but also around the entire education system across the country. And in these terms it all came back to the political issues that our party has been addressing for many years now. That was how we campaigned, and I think we were successful in spreading our message to the other students. We were coming back into open student politics after a long time. We were new faces, with a new agenda. People knew about our commitment and the gains our party has been able to make during the People’s War. People can actually see the gains, we are now the Republic of Nepal.

Peterson: So the revolutionary students were very clear about putting the elections in the context of the wider political context, the revolution. Can you elaborate a little bit on this political process and the role of students within it?

Bhattarai: As you know, the People’s War was initiated in 1996 and since its beginning students were at the forefront of the revolutionary process. Many thousands of students have sacrificed their education and their lives. They left their homes, their families to participate in the revolution. In those terms, whether it was within the People’s Army, or in our party organisation, students have been playing key roles in all fields. In terms of the student organisation it has been in an interesting position. In the schools we were able to maintain our own committees and continued our organisational work. We took up agendas and fought for them, and on certain campuses we have been very successful. We especially try to work on the public institutions.

In Nepal there is unequal education. Public institutions are in very bad condition, but this is where poor people, people from rural areas, or people from marginalised groups must go to study. These areas are where our student organisation is focusing. At a national level, we have been addressing how we should move towards ending the privatisation of education and empowering the public institutions. This is all linked up with the social economic reality of Nepal, and pulling Nepal away from feudalism. Uprooting the old system.

Peterson: In recent days the Maoist-led government has been basically overthrown by the unconstitutional actions of the President, and a new government has been formed by Madhav Kumar Nepal from the UML. Has this disrupted the political process and your plans for education?

Bhattarai: Of course! This is disrupting everything. It needs to also be analyzed in the context of the political processes. The coming of Madhav Kumar Nepal, the people now understand this government exists as a puppet government only, backed by certain forces which do not want the Maoists to be successful in implementing revolutionary programs and policies. Since this is a puppet government, it is aimed at pushing back the Maoists, what they have achieved and trying to get them to go back to the people’s war in Nepal. There are those that would like Nepal to become like another Sri Lanka.

It is all simply against our agenda, it is against making public institutions a better place, against having an equal education for all and in a way that people from all regions of Nepal can have a primary and secondary education in their own language, as they want and according to their own priorities and the necessities of Nepal, not in a way that is determined and dependant on private institutions.

So eventually, a person like Madhav Kumar Nepal- or any other person, it’s not about a new person becoming Prime Minister- but anyone who comes to power in this way is bound to backtrack on our revolutionary policies. In the education sector it will mean re-empowering the private sector. The Maoist government had started to gain some control over the private education sector, through a new tax policy. The new government will backtrack on this.

Peterson: The new government is made up of 22 parties, and doesn’t have the support of the party that won the elections- how long can it last?

Bhattarai: There is no basis for this government to exist for any significant time. The way it has been formed without any coherent agenda or program or common ground. For a government to be formed it should have some sort of common political ideal that is binding. For these parties it is like some invisible hand is holding them together. How long it will last, I don’t know. In the Constituent Assembly when Koirala (of the Nepali Congress Party) proposed M.K. Nepal as the Prime Minister you could clearly see problems already. All the parties came forward to support the new government, but all of them had ifs, buts and maybes. All the parties came forward with their own baggage and agenda, which can be very different to what the UML stands for. So it is like some invisible hand is holding them together and it can’t last long. There is no common agenda, policy, ideology- except for the one reason, which seems to be to ‘teach the Maoists a lesson’. Time will tell how this all pans out.

Peterson: So now there is this contradiction between the direction of the government and the aspirations of the people, as we saw in the People’s War, the Jana Andolan and in the election results. How will this struggle between the revolution and the status-quo be played out?

Bhattarai: The whole thing is about contradictions, that’s what justifies us, our party. That’s why we waged the People’s War, and we have not abandoned the People’s War. There is a continuation of the same process and struggle we started more than 12 years ago with the People’s War. We have made some achievements, and we need to sustain those. We need to always keep in mind the international situation, the national situation, we need Marxism Leninism Maoism and need to be thinking about what that means in the 21st Century world.

We need to keep all this in mind and we are faced with what is definitely a very challenging situation. We have all these radical agendas, and that’s how we have been able to mobilise so many people, the whole country and now we have to do so once again. We have worked with forces that are status quo-ist, that still have an attachment to feudalism, still have a tendency to look to expansionists and imperialists. This was to do away with the monarchy in Nepal and make Nepal a Democratic Republic. That was what the process was about.

Now Nepal is a republic, and this is a big thing. Sometimes people forget that Nepal is now a Republic and minimize the significance of it, but this is a big achievement keeping in mind the history of Nepal. Having said that, now we must move ahead. Just because the Monarchy is gone doesn’t mean feudal elements have all been uprooted. That is the situation right now. We have removed the Monarchy, and to do that we had some kind of alliance with what are status quo forces, so I guess now there is a huge challenge for our party. Now what? Where do we go from here? For us it is still a fight to establish a Democratic Republic for establishing a socialist system in Nepal. We have to be oriented towards socialism, our party has said very clearly that we are oriented to socialism. For this we have waged the whole struggle for the sovereignty of the people of Nepal. The army issue was never about one general Katawal, it was all about the sovereignty of Nepal. For Nepal, right now, the challenge is to internally fight with the status quo forces and externally fight against expansionist and imperialist forces. As I said, there are many fronts, there are many challenges, but challenges always come with possibilities. So we are confident. We have had many fronts, People’s War was one front we fought on, this is just another.

Peterson: You mentioned the international situation. It is a very difficult situation for revolution, there is no more USSR and China has well and truly abandoned the revolution. So what do you make of the international situation, and in particular, are you looking to Latin America, where there are revolutions also happening?

Bhattarai: Our party, as far as I know, has some links with the parties and people there. Personally I have been following these situations like in Venezuela and Cuba. I would certainly like my party to have more serious links with Latin America. I think our party hasn’t had as close links as we should have, but this is largely because there are so many differences between our situations. There are certainly similarities, in terms of our goals and our ideals and we are all waging an anti-imperialist struggle, but we are in a very specific situation. The geopolitics of Nepal is very specific and different to Latin America.

Having deep links with Latin American revolutionaries is a longer term goal. We should have those links, ideologically. We should be having a discussion and learning from what they have been able to do, their policies and programs, but at a diplomatic level having strong links with Latin America doesn’t make much sense because of our geopolitical situation. We are landlocked between India and China. Diplomatic links are important, but maybe in the longer term, but the policies, programs and leadership of Latin American revolutions we have a lot we can learn from.

Peterson: In Nepal the youth are playing a very big role in the revolution, but at least within Kathmandu there are also many westernised youth who look more towards Europe, the US and India for their culture, and then also politics. Is there a cultural clash between westernised youths in urban areas, and revolutionary youth?

Bhattarai: I wouldn’t say there is a culture clash, but as you say there is a community of upper class pro-western kids. I think it’s not their fault, its nobody’s fault really, its just where they come from. They are more likely to look to the USA, the UK or India for their education. It all really starts with education, and then becomes cultural, so I think its more of an issue of class background. There isn’t so much a cultural clash, but a clash of class interests. This is bound to happen as they tend to look to the west, and we the Maoists look to ourselves and the lower classes. At some level there is bound to be a clash because they are in favour of more privatisation of schools and institutions where as we stand against that and for the betterment of public institutions. But I don’t think… I think we are quite capable to talk to these youth and at least get them to listen to our agenda.

There are some westernised youth on this campus, and these people really just want stability and peace. They have everything else- money, cars. They have no problems, except for peace and stability. So if the Maoists can give them that, then for the time being there won’t be such clashes. These youth are basically the product of the whole system, and we should try to avoid antagonism between our generation at this time given to political situation.

Peterson: There are a lot of Nepalis who go internationally for education. Does the student union have international organisations and try and organise Nepali students abroad?

Bhattarai: Our student union does have an international department which looks into this aspect and establishes links with Nepali Students studying abroad. We believe it is not the fault of the students who leave, they just want a good education in a good environment and we know our country right now is not able to give that. Keeping that in mind and being practical, we look to make links with these students so we can encourage them to come back and use their expertise to develop the country.

Peterson: Are you optimistic about the future of Nepal?

Bhattarai: Definitely! Otherwise I wouldn’t be where I am right now!

Also published at 21st Century Socialism. Further reports by Ben Peterson on the situation in Nepal can be read at Lal Salam- Revolution in the Himalayas.

News is breaking that former Gurkhas have won the court case giving them right to stay in the UK. This affects around 1500 people, who served in the Gurkha Rifles.

Last year the government changed the law to allow Gurkhas who had served in the British Army to live in the UK, and draw a full British Army pension, but in an extraordinarily vindictive and spiteful caveat they excluded those who retired prior to 1997, when the Gurkha regiment was based in Hong Kong.

 The Gurkhas’ solicitor, Martin Howe, speaking to the BBC says the case has dragged on for so long that seven or eight Gurkhas who applied for entry into the UK have already died.

Mr Howe represents around 1,500 men who wish to come to the UK, but says the government has been fighting “tooth and nail” to keep them out.

He sees it as a clear-cut case of discrimination, as the Gurkhas have not been treated equally, compared to other foreign soldiers.

Many of these elderly ex-soldiers are in hardship in Nepal, and need medical attention. They have each served 25 years in the British Army, and some 200000 Gurkhas fought for Britain in the two world wars.

Pictures from Richard Searle - former Gurkhas protesting outside the Labour Party conference

As Nepal votes to become a republic, there have been clashes outside the Royal palace, as demonstrators try to evict the former-King, instead of giving him the agreed 14 days to leave.

The following interview with Prachanda, the Chairman of Nepal’s Maoist party is from Hamropalo.com.

Karan Thapar: Because the Maoists are a relatively unknown entity, there are many people in India who are apprehensive about your coming to power. Can you understand their concern?

Prachanda: Yes, I think so because during the emergency, the kind of image and the propaganda that was there in the country was different. But we were always committed to multi-party competition and peace at that time. However, people did not know about our new political developments then.

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By Mritiunjoy Mohanty

The background
On 5th October 2007, negotiations between the Seven Party Alliance (Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and five smaller parties) and the CPN-Maoists broke down on the issue of electoral modalities and the abolition of the monarchy. As a result, elections scheduled for 22nd November 2007 were indefinitely postponed. Negotiations broke down because, having formally signed an agreement on 16th November 2006 stating that, among other things, members of the Constituent Assembly would be elected by a mix of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) and that the fate of the monarchy would be decided by the Assembly, the CPN-Maoists went back on both. They wanted that the Constituent Assembly be elected only through PR and the fate of the monarchy be decided prior to the elections [1]. The postponement was greeted by analysts and a sceptical mainstream media as another indicator that the CPN-Maoists, afraid of the ballot box, were never serious about elections and that the November 2006 agreement was merely a tactical ploy [2].

Whether the walkout itself was a tactical ploy or the CPN-Maoists were seriously having second thoughts, is difficult to assess. But it does seem that they shared the general perception among mainstream cognoscenti that they (i.e. the CPN-Maoists) stood at a clear electoral disadvantage in FPTP seats, and were likely to come in third, behind the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML[3]. The November 2006 agreement had stipulated that the Constituent Assembly would consist of 405 members. Of these 205 were to be elected by the FPTP system, 204 by PR and 16 nominated by the cabinet. On April 12, 2007 the interim parliament accepted the suggestion of the Electoral Constituency Delineaion Commission (ECDC) that there be 497 seats with 240 each to be elected by FPTP and PR and 17 to be nominated by the cabinet. It was this agreement that was up for renegotiation as a result of the 5th October 2007 breakdown.

Finally, after protracted negotiations, in mid-December 2007 the Seven Party Alliance and the CPN-Maoists agreed that the number of PR seats would be increased while the number of FPTP seats remained the same. The Constituent Assembly would now consist of 601 members, of whom 240 will be elected by the FPTP system, 335 by PR and 26 were to be nominated by the cabinet [4]. Elections were to be held by mid-April 2008 and the monarchy abolished before then. On 28th December the interim parliament voted to abolish the monarchy and Nepal was declared a republic [5]. Elections were scheduled for 10th April. The Seven Party Alliance and the CPN-Maoists were unable to agree on madhesi [6] autonomy and therefore these issues remained unaddressed in the final outcome of the negotiations. As a result, in January 2008, agitations by madhesis in the terai-region of southern Nepal[7] threatened to derail the election process but were finally settled with an agreement in February that their autonomy demands would be considered by the Constituent Assembly and an increase in the madhesi share of PR seats [8].

The election and the outcomes:
Finally, on 10th April 2008, Nepalis cast their vote as much with trepidation that something might still derail this long-awaited election, as with hope that this election might usher in a more plural and more equal Nepal. It is fair to say that while nobody was quite sure which way the election was going, nobody had quite anticipated the final outcome – CPN-Maoists winning half the FPTP seats [9]. Indeed, as we have already noted, the consensus was the CPN-Maoists would come third. Instead, they won 120 of the 240 FPTP seats [10]. The Nepali Congress with 37 and the CPN-UML with 33 were a distant second and third. Parties representing madhesis of the Terai region performed very well. The Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum secured 30 and the Terai Madhes Party won 9 seats.

Equally importantly, monarchist parties were unable to win a single FPTP seat. In the PR elections even though Nepali Congress (73) and the CPN-UML (70) fared much better, they were nonetheless behind the CPN-Maoists (100). The results, to use the language of the normally prosaic BBC, were an “election thunderbolt”.

The final tally of seats obtained by major parties taking into account both FPTP and PR voting systems is as follows: CPN-Maoists – 220 seats; Nepali Congress – 110 seats; CPN-UML – 103 seats; Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum – 52 seats; and the Terai Madhes Party – 20.

It is one of the ironies of history that it is because of the PR system, the weightage of which the CPN-Maoists fought so hard to increase, that mainstream political parties, Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, do not stand marginalised in the political process. But despite the fact of the CPN-Maoists overwhelming electoral victory, given that Nepal’s Constituent Assembly will use a 2/3 majority decision making rule, they will have to forge coalitions to push forward their progressive agenda. And the coalitions will have to be broad-based and perhaps issue-based as well, because even an alliance with the CPNUML does not yield a 2/3 majority. Be that as it may, what is undeniable is that the electorate of Nepal has clearly rejected the monarchy, feudalism and the old order and along with it mainstream political parties. And it is this rejection of monarchy and feudalism which makes this election truly historic.

It is important to recognise both the breadth and the depth of support for the CPNMaoists. Only in 16 parliamentary districts out of 75, did the CPN-Maoists not win at least in one constituency. And of these 16, only in 1, Parsa (5 FPTP seats) in the Terai region of southern Nepal, did they not finish either in 2nd or 3rd place in at least one seat.

Only in 38 FPTP seats, out of a total of 240, did the CPN-Maoists not finish in the top three positions. Or put differently, in 74 out of 75 parliamentary constituencies, the CPN Maoists finished among the top 3 political parties in at least one FPTP seat. And of these 73 districts, in 58 it won at least one FPTP seat. It won 4/10 seats in relatively affluent Kathmandu. In what is clearly their weakest region, the Terai, they won at least a dozen seats and came 2nd in another 15. Their performance in the Terai must be particularly galling given the popularity they had achieved in that region in 2003 and 2004.

Not only were the results unexpected, the Nepali feudal and liberal elite were clearly caught off-guard. Despite its breadth and the depth, some liberal analysts have only very grudgingly accepted the CPN-Maoists electoral victory but seen it in an entirely negative light, arguing that people, afraid otherwise of a return to violence, voted them to victory [11]. Some have argued that had they not mis-calculated the strength of the CPN Maoists, they would not have cut their traditional links with the monarchy. For liberal mainstream parties already there is the worry that if they co-operate with the CPN Maoists and help implement constitutional change, they will in effect be helping consolidate the political power of the latter[12]. In hindsight, there are a couple of decisions that will probably have defining influences on deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, and therefore in the way Nepali polity evolves. First, the CPN-Maoists insistence that the interim parliament abolish the monarchy and declare Nepal a republic prior to the elections was strategically a very important move, particularly in the light of post-election responses. Second, because 60% of seats in the Constituent Assembly have been chosen through PR and there is proportionate representation for women, all ethnicities (janajatis [indigenous people] and madhesis), caste groups (including dalits) and muslims, for the first time in its history (indeed in the history of South Asia) Nepal’s elected representatives will reflect much better the plurality and diversity of its population and give women a more effective voice
in politics. In the days ahead this should stand both federalism and democracy in good stead.

Therefore the CPN-Maoists insistence that the weightage of PR seats in the Constituent Assembly be increased will have a beneficial institutional impact on the evolution of Nepali democracy. Finally, however, the inability of the CPN-Maoists to force mainstream parties to take on board the issue of madhesi autonomy was an important strategic setback [13]. It was a setback not only because as a result the CPN-Maoists lost ground in the Terai but also because the issue of madhesi autonomy finally came on board not as a part of a progressive agenda but as a result of a divisive, identity (language and race) driven agenda, led at least in part by forces of reaction.

For CPN-Maoists this is the end of one phase of their journey which began in February 1996 when they eschewed parliamentary politics and decided that armed struggle was the only way to overthrow monarchy and feudalism in Nepal [14]. This was shortly after the first elected communist (led by the CPN-UML) national government in South Asia held power briefly (for around a year) in Kathmandu. Then the CPN-Maoists were strongly dissuaded from taking up arms and for a while were ignored by both mainstream political parties and the monarchy as a fringe group with influence limited to northern and western Nepal. By the turn of the century the CPN-Maoists and its military wing, the PLA, were difficult to ignore as larger and larger swathes of Nepal came under the military (and political) control of the PLA and CPN-Maoists.

But it was the accession of King Gyanendra to the monarchy after the massacre of the Nepali royal family in June 2001 that altered the military and political dynamic. Within six months of his accession he had declared a political emergency and asked the RNA to frontally take on the PLA.

In the brutal war that followed in which thousands died on both sides, including civilians, the PLA effectively contained the RNA and dealt it some severe blows. On the back of this military success by early 2005, CPN-Maoists were an important presence in all but 2 of the 75 districts and controlled more than 75% of the countryside. The coup-de-grace was actually delivered by King Gyanendra when in February 2005 he dismissed the cabinet, assumed all executive authority and arrested leading members of mainstream political parties. This move literally forced the hand of mainstream political parties who, as a result, formed the Seven Party Alliance and offered to dialogue with the Maoists.

The offer of dialogue was accepted and negotiations led to the 12-point agreement in November 2005 between the Seven Party Alliance and the CPN-Maoists and the launch of Jan Andolan II in March 2006. Jan Andolan II effectively brought urban Nepal into the movement for restoration of democracy and against the monarchy. In the face of widespread popular resistance, King Gyanendra finally succumbed and on 24th April relinquished executive powers and restored parliament. Negotiations were then opened between the interim government, led by the Seven Party Alliance, and the CPN-Maoists which led to the November 2006 agreement with respect to elections for the constituent assembly and the return of the PLA and the Nepali Army (the RNA had been renamed after it came under civilian control) to barracks. The rest as the cliché goes is history. It is worth noting that just as when it took up armed struggle, so also when it returned to parliamentary politics, the CPN-Maoists were advised by fraternal parties that it was the wrong tactic at the wrong moment. It is to their credit that they kept their counsel and chose to stay the course.

The road ahead
It is important to remember that as a part of the November 2006 agreement the PLA, despite enormous pressure from the Nepali Army, was not demobilised or disarmed. It was confined to seven (7) designated cantonments spread across the country and its arms and ammunition put under lock and key in its control but the supervision of the UN.

Indeed the agreement specifically mentions that a separate commission will be set up to oversee the integration of the PLA into the Nepali Army [15]. Now that the CPN-Maoists have won such a resounding victory, the likelihood of the PLA’s integration into the Nepali Army increases significantly.

The political significance of this cannot be overestimated. The CPN-Maoists are where they are in large part because of armed struggle the PLA waged and because the RNA was unable to defeat them. As the CPN-Maoists take on mainstream political parties on the right and centre, the feudal elite and the urban bourgeoisie, an army that is at least neutral (which the unreformed Nepali Army almost certainly would not have been) will increase enormously its political space and manoeuvrability. It is worth recalling that in Venezuela, Hugo Chavez (and the PSUV) has been able pursue left-of-centre reform within a democratic framework because in part he as the support and backing of the Venezuelan Army. In Bolivia on the other hand Evo Morales and the MAS have a much tougher battle counteracting the oligarchy and the forces of reaction because the army is weaker and does not back the MAS in quite the same way. Therefore the fact that a revolutionary army will be integrated into the Nepali Army should help the CPN-Maoists cope with feudal and bourgeois opposition from within and imperialist opposition from without. That there will be such opposition of course goes without saying.

If the CPN-Maoists were in such a commanding position both politically and militarily in 2005, why did they choose to eschew the logical culmination of armed struggle – the overthrow of the state - and return to parliamentary politics? It is of course difficult to know for sure but in their own understanding, there seem to have been at least three important reasons for this: First, the CPN-Maoist assessment that whereas it was possible to militarily defeat the then RNA, the human cost would be so high as to make the victory pyrrhic [16]. Second, the international conjuncture was not propitious to bring to fruition an armed socialist revolution. And finally, given that the CPN-Maoists were sufficiently established across Nepal to be a serious contender in elections, it was felt that opting for parliamentary path would confer upon it political legitimacy even among those who were not its supporters [17].

Right from 2005 the CPN-Maoists have consistently said that what they aim for is an end to monarchy and feudalism and the establishment of a bourgeois, democratic [18] and republican Nepal with a mixed capitalist economy. Positions that have been repeatedly reiterated since the CPN-Maoists won the recent elections.

But building a bourgeois capitalist economy is easier said than done. To break feudalism’s hold in the economy and society land reforms have to be forced through and despite the widespread support for CPN-Maoists, it will face stiff resistance. The bitterness and vehemence of the opposition to Evo Morales and the MAS in Bolivia has more do with the decision to implement land-reforms that seriously threatened the economic power of large land owners rather than the decision to increases taxes on natural gas and use it to supplement elder pensions [19]. And without land-reforms the
feudal economy will remain an albatross around Nepal’s neck as it has been around that of Pakistan.

Equally important its urban bourgeoisie is small and weak and largely dependent on India. Nepal is landlocked and caught between two emerging powers both of whom are slowly striding onto the world stage. India has long considered Nepal as belonging to its ‘sphere of influence’ something that has not been seriously contested by China.

The long and short of it is that the pre-conditions for an autonomous path of development which was what successful bourgeois capitalist growth would require are not there [20].

But both the domestic and international conjuncture makes this at least a possibility, with many ifs and buts, but still a possibility. The CPN-Maoists emphatic victory in the elections and the fact that the PLA has not been demobilised makes it plausible that the land reform agenda will be fulfilled. Given the rise to dominance of the urban bourgeoisie in India, it is unlikely to object to land-reforms [21]. Indeed today, in the
abstract even the World Bank will support land-reforms as being a necessary part of a transition to a successful capitalist economy. And the fact that both China and India are rapidly growing economies could actually provide Nepal’s fledgling urban bourgeoisie both the economic (in terms of access to growing markets) and the strategic space within which to chart a relatively autonomous path (and I guess the operational word here is ‘relatively’).

But for all this the key is land-reforms without which the CPN-Maoists will be unable to break the back of the feudal economy and then this great victory that we celebrate today will have come to naught. The unfortunate thing is that CPN-Maoists and the CPN-UML taken together do not command a 2/3 majority in the constituent assembly. Therefore to push through land reforms the two communist parties will need the support of bourgeois liberal parties. It will be interesting to see if they get this support and at what price. And really it is here that the failure of CPN-Maoists to force mainstream political parties to take on board the madhesi issue might come to bite, because most madhesi parties will in all likelihood be a part of the anti-land-reform coalition.

Finally, another South Asian country, Pakistan, held in February this year watershed elections. Watershed because it has meant a renewal of democratic forces in the politics of Pakistan. The emergence of PPP and PML-N as the two largest parties nationally and the of victory of ANP in the North West Frontier Province was a clear rejection of authoritarianism at home and a victory of secular anti-US forces. Equally importantly, for the first time in Pakistan’s politics, large numbers of feudal landlords who contested this election actually lost to urban middle class candidates. The growth of the urban economy and urbanisation (50% of Pakistan’s population today lives in urban areas) is perhaps slowly loosening the stranglehold of feudal landlords on Pakistani society and politics.

Perhaps the Pakistani elite will “seize the democratic opportunity offered by this election” and move Pakistan towards a functioning democracy and a plural capitalist economy that affords a reasonable possibility of social mobility.

Elites therefore will matter, both in Pakistan and Nepal, as to the outcome of this democratic renewal. But personally I am more hopeful of Nepal. The renewal in Pakistan is led by the elite and upper middle class and typically in these circumstances (i.e., elite dominance), democracy degenerates into becoming a mechanism for intra-elite dialogue, negotiation and conflict resolution and the only mobility that is ever attempted (or afforded) is that of the upper middle class, leaving the marginalised and the poor where they were to begin with. In Nepal on the other hand, democratic renewal has happened through a revolutionary movement that has finally empowered those that have been marginalised and discriminated against. If questions about the economy can be addressed, and I agree it is a very big if, because the renewal is led by the poor and the marginalised, it is Nepal that affords the greater possibility of a fairer, more plural and more just society. After all not for nothing did the CPN-Maoists wage an armed struggle. And Nepali democracy would have completed a journey that began in April 1990 with Jan Andolan I.

(Mritiunjoy Mohanty is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta (IIM Calcutta) in Kolkata. He is currently on leave and a Visiting Rsearcher with Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) of the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Montreal, Canada. He gratefully acknowledges comments from Dolores Chew, Maurice Dufour and Daya Varma on earlier versions of this article.)

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